Türkiye’s Energy Security Strategy and the Eastern Mediterranean Dispute

Like all nations, Türkiye must secure a stable energy supply to sustain economic development and growth. Energy security is not merely an economic concern—it is directly tied to the continuity of stable governance. Accordingly, energy security is regarded as a vital national interest. However, as of 2022, Türkiye’s energy self-sufficiency stood at only 32%, meaning the country relied on imports for 68% of its energy needs.

Türkiye’s Vulnerability in Energy Security

In 2022, Türkiye imported 100% of its natural gas and approximately 93% of its petroleum. This heavy dependency renders Türkiye highly vulnerable to external shocks in the realm of energy security. Fluctuating global oil prices, geopolitical instability, long-term resource depletion, and climate change all present significant risks to the country’s ability to secure a stable energy supply.

Notably, Türkiye sources about 75% of its energy imports from Middle Eastern countries such as Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. However, both Iran and Iraq are widely regarded as politically and geopolitically unstable partners. While pipeline infrastructure offers a safer alternative to maritime transport, it remains susceptible to sabotage by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), regional conflicts such as the Karabakh dispute, and particularly, the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war.

Diversification of Energy Imports and Foreign Policy

To mitigate this vulnerability, Türkiye has pursued energy import diversification. It has engaged in proactive diplomacy with energy-rich nations such as Qatar, Libya, and Kuwait while also involving itself in long-standing regional conflicts in Syria, Libya, and Palestine to reduce security risks in the Middle East.

Türkiye has employed a Neo-Ottoman foreign policy approach, leveraging its soft power rooted in Islamic communal identity to enhance relations with Middle Eastern countries. This approach has facilitated more stable energy supply channels and attracted foreign investment.

However, the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine war in the 2020s disrupted global supply chains. At the same time, Türkiye’s domestic economic crisis and political instability deepened. The dramatic depreciation of the lira sharply increased the cost of energy imports, further undermining energy security.

Projecting Internal Crisis Outward: The "Mavi Vatan" Doctrine

To overcome these mounting challenges, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s administration sought a new breakthrough: the natural resources of the Eastern Mediterranean. These resources represented a rare opportunity to reverse Türkiye’s dependence on imported energy and strengthen its energy security through domestic exploration. Additionally, the administration could redirect domestic frustrations outward.

To legitimize its expansion into the Eastern Mediterranean, the Erdoğan government developed a new narrative. Faced with declining economic growth, increasing energy insecurity, and waning regional influence, Türkiye needed a new national vision. Erdoğan found it in the concept of “Mavi Vatan” (Blue Homeland).

The term was first introduced by Admiral Cem Gürdeniz during the 2006 Black Sea and Maritime Security Symposium hosted by the Turkish Naval Command. In 2019, it gained prominence as Türkiye’s Black Sea, Aegean, and Eastern Mediterranean fleets conducted their first joint military exercise, positioning “Mavi Vatan” as a central pillar of Türkiye’s maritime security doctrine.

The Significance of the “Mavi Vatan” Doctrine

At its core, the “Mavi Vatan” doctrine calls for a redefinition of Türkiye’s maritime rights and sphere of influence. It symbolizes a revival of the Ottoman-era maritime dominance in the Mediterranean and asserts Türkiye’s ambition to reclaim political, military, and economic power across the Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea regions. It also serves as a strategic response to the so-called “anti-Türkiye coalition” seeking to isolate Ankara.

The doctrine integrates both economic and security considerations. The continental shelf west of Cyprus is estimated to contain 1.8 billion barrels of oil and 3.45 trillion cubic meters of natural gas—reserves highly desirable for Türkiye’s energy future. However, many experts argue that the Erdoğan government is leveraging nationalist sentiment and the rivalry with Greece to bolster domestic political support. Predictably, the “Mavi Vatan” rhetoric escalated tensions with Greece.

Projecting the “Mavi Vatan” Doctrine: Igniting the Eastern Mediterranean Dispute

The first flashpoint was the delimitation of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). The issue surfaced in 2012 when Greece unilaterally declared an EEZ based on the small island of Kastellorizo, located off Türkiye’s southern coast. This effectively limited Türkiye’s EEZ to its mainland shoreline. At the time, the Turkish government offered no formal objection.

The dispute escalated in November 2019 when Türkiye signed an EEZ delimitation agreement with Libya. In retaliation, on August 6, 2020, Greece signed an EEZ agreement with Egypt, asserting that Türkiye’s deal with Libya was invalid by referencing Crete as the legal maritime boundary.

In response, the Erdoğan administration dispatched seismic exploration vessels to the Eastern Mediterranean and began energy exploration operations. Türkiye insisted that the area fell within its sovereign waters under international law, arguing that Greece’s EEZ claim based on Kastellorizo violated both legal norms and customary practice.

The situation escalated into a diplomatic crisis: On August 12, 2020, Turkish and Greek naval escort ships collided, heightening the military tension. France, Italy, and Cyprus expressed support for Greece, turning the dispute into a broader power struggle. Türkiye responded with joint naval exercises with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on August 25, while Greece, Cyprus, France, and Italy conducted their own joint military drills from August 26–28.

Outlook and Implications of the Eastern Mediterranean Dispute

Although tensions briefly de-escalated thanks to German mediation, underlying hostilities between Türkiye and Greece persist. President Erdoğan has declared that the exploration of Eastern Mediterranean resources is Türkiye’s sovereign right and condemned France and Italy as neo-imperialist powers interfering with its national interests. Türkiye’s refusal to halt its energy exploration has resulted in mounting criticism and international sanctions.

Türkiye remains committed to the “Mavi Vatan” doctrine. In August 2022, it resumed gas drilling operations in the Eastern Mediterranean, triggering renewed joint military exercises between rival blocs. Türkiye’s strategic goal remains clear: to secure regional influence by reviving its economy through energy self-sufficiency.

This narrative was also emphasized during the 100th anniversary of the Republic in 2023, when President Erdoğan proclaimed a vision for the “Century of Türkiye”. Energy independence has become a central pillar of this national vision, serving not only economic but also political purposes by uniting the populace and projecting regional power.

A Fragile Thaw and Renewed Tensions

On December 7, 2023, the two nations issued a “Declaration of Friendship and Good Neighborliness”, sparking hope for de-escalation and constructive dialogue. However, this optimism quickly evaporated when Greece announced its Maritime Spatial Plan (MSP) on April 16, 2024.

Although the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed the plan aimed to promote tourism, protect cultural heritage, and improve maritime transportation, Türkiye viewed it as a direct infringement on its maritime jurisdiction in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean Seas. Türkiye responded by announcing plans to release its own maritime spatial plan.

Thus, a new chapter of conflict has once again begun.