Trump 2.0 Middle East Policy after Iran–Israel War

Paik, Seunghoon
(Hankuk University of Foreign Studies)

I. U.S. Approach to the New Middle East Order

Trump’s second term has gone further than his first in institutionalizing the “America First” doctrine, fundamentally reshaping U.S. engagement in the Middle East. The administration
defines national interest narrowly, emphasizing the reduction of financial and military burdens
abroad while maximizing immediate returns to the United States. This has produced a distinctive pattern of transactional diplomacy, where relationships are judged by their utility rather than by shared values, and where cooperation is packaged as explicit quid pro quo arrangements. Military engagement has been deliberately minimized, shifting from large-scale interventions to targeted strikes and intermittent deterrence operations. At the same time, diplomacy has been fused with economic tools, creating economic–security linkages that tie trade, technology transfer, and investment agreements directly to defense and security cooperation.
Unlike previous administrations—whether the liberal internationalist impulses of Obama or the multilateralism of Biden—Trump 2.0 has shown little interest in promoting democracy, human rights, or international institutional norms. Rather than pursuing a balance between interests and values, his administration has prioritized short-term advantages that reinforce domestic political legitimacy. This orientation reflects a deeper realist shift in American foreign policy: one that abandons the language of liberal order-building and embraces unilateralism. Crucially, this turn has been executed not through congressional legislation or multilateral agreements but through unilateral executive authority, allowing the White House to bypass traditional checks and deliver rapid, visible outcomes.
The 2025 budget and tax reforms marked a watershed in this shift. By drastically cutting funds
for diplomacy, scientific research, and social programs while funneling resources into immigration enforcement and hardline border control, the Trump administration revealed its
priorities. These reallocations undermined Washington’s capacity to sustain influence through
soft power, development assistance, and institution-based diplomacy—traditional pillars of U.S.
engagement in the Middle East. Furthermore, widespread staff reductions in the State Department and intelligence agencies hollowed out bureaucratic expertise, weakening America’s ability to engage in nuanced, long-term regional strategy. In this environment, the White House increasingly leaned on a handful of executive orders to dictate the contours of Middle East policy.
Israel emerged as the primary strategic asset under this approach. Trump 2.0’s unwavering
support for Israel was less about ideological affinity with Zionism or shared democratic values
and more about Israel’s functional role as a reliable partner at a time when Washington’s global leverage was shrinking. Executive orders demonstrate this shift clearly. EO 14204, issued in February 2025, expanded sanctions against Iran for its “egregious actions,” targeting the
Revolutionary Guards and constraining Tehran’s regional activities. EO 14203 imposed sanctions on the International Criminal Court to block investigations into Israeli conduct in Palestine,
underscoring Washington’s willingness to shield Israel even at the expense of undermining
international legal frameworks. EO 14175 designated Yemen’s Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization, a move that aligned U.S. policy with Saudi and Emirati objectives. Finally, EO
14188 sought to combat anti-Semitism domestically, with secondary effects of suppressing pro
Palestinian activism such as the BDS movement.
Together, these executive orders reveal a coherent strategic pattern: sanctioning adversaries,
isolating international institutions, and reinforcing traditional alliances. This reflects a deliberate abandonment of America’s historic role as a balancer—an actor that mediated among competing forces in the region—in favor of becoming a partisan architect, actively reshaping the balance of power to privilege its closest allies. While this has generated a perception of decisiveness and loyalty among U.S. partners such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, it has also hardened regional divides, weakened the legitimacy of international institutions, and signaled to adversaries
that Washington’s engagement is increasingly zero-sum. In this sense, Trump 2.0’s approach to
the Middle East order is less about stabilizing the region and more about reengineering it
according to narrowly defined American and allied interests.
 

II. Country-Specific Approaches

1. Israel–Palestine
   In the Israeli–Palestinian arena, the Trump 2.0 administration approached the Gaza conflict as a localized issue that did not directly threaten U.S. national security. As a result, it adopted a strategy of temporary ceasefires and hostage exchanges, projecting an image of neutrality while allowing Israeli military operations to continue largely unchecked. This “peace mediator” façade was politically useful, but the lack of a substantive “Day After” strategy for Gaza governance and reconstruction significantly deepened instability.
   Several proposals were floated, including an Arab-funded reconstruction mechanism or an interim administration led by figures such as former Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad.
   However, none materialized due to the absence of American security guarantees and Trump’s rejection of U.N. or international institutional involvement. Egypt and Jordan, reluctant to assume heavy responsibilities, distanced themselves from security arrangements. In this vacuum, Israel proposed a temporary administration of Gaza, but this was widely seen as insufficient to stabilize the territory. Ultimately, U.S. disengagement left Washington more dependent on Israel as a partner while undermining prospects for a two-state solution and fueling the risk of protracted
   conflict.

    

2. Saudi Arabia
   Normalization with Saudi Arabia emerged as one of the most ambitious yet complicated goals of Trump’s second term. The negotiations revolved around a comprehensive defense–nuclear economic package, with Riyadh demanding five core concessions: (1) a defense treaty with the U.S., (2) cooperation on a civilian nuclear program, (3) streamlined arms exports, (4) a free trade
   agreement, and (5) joint initiatives in artificial intelligence and emerging technologies. Such demands underscored the transactional logic of Trump 2.0’s diplomacy, where strategic ties were directly linked to material bargains.
   However, the Gaza conflict hardened Saudi Arabia’s position. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman insisted on a concrete timetable for Palestinian statehood as a prerequisite for any normalization, aligning domestic nationalist sentiment with wider Islamic legitimacy. This created a triangular negotiation dynamic among the U.S., Israel, and Saudi Arabia, with Washington caught between Israel’s unwillingness to concede on Palestinian sovereignty and Riyadh’s political necessity to demand it. For Trump, the Saudi track offered the potential to reinforce U.S. influence in the Gulf and tie Riyadh closer to Western technological and security networks. Yet without progress on the Palestinian issue, normalization remained fragile and risked collapsing into symbolic gestures rather than structural alignment.

    

3. Iran
   Trump 2.0’s Iran policy represented a revival—and intensification—of the “Ultimate Maximum Pressure” strategy. Sanctions were expanded across energy, banking, and maritime sectors, aiming to reduce Tehran’s oil exports, constrain its foreign reserves, and disrupt informal trade networks with Asia. At the same time, Washington left a narrow channel for conditional negotiations, signaling that relief might be possible if Iran agreed to broader concessions not limited to nuclear restrictions. Unlike the Obama-era JCPOA, Trump’s terms demanded limits on Iran’s missile program, proxy networks, and even domestic human rights practices, effectively approaching the logic of regime transformation.
   Yet this strategy exposed sharp divisions within the administration. Vice President Vance framed Iran as a “manageable adversary,” opposing outright war and advocating calibrated deterrence. In contrast, the Pentagon and congressional conservatives pressed for surgical strikes or decisive deterrence. This internal discord blurred the line between diplomacy and coercion, raising the risk of escalation by accident or miscalculation. Furthermore, unilateral sanctions faced enforcement challenges without allied support, creating opportunities for China and Russia to expand economic and strategic ties with Tehran. Thus, while pressure eroded Iran’s economic base, it also risked narrowing Washington’s strategic options and drawing the U.S. closer to confrontation.

    

4. Syria and Lebanon
   In Syria and Lebanon, Trump’s approach was shaped by the assessment that neither country represented a core U.S. security interest. Accordingly, the administration adopted a “delegated stabilization” strategy, shifting burdens onto regional actors while maintaining a small American footprint. In Syria, between 900 and 2,000 U.S. troops remained in the northeast to support the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) against remnants of ISIS. Trump had announced a withdrawal during his first term but reversed course amid concerns over security vacuums. In Lebanon, the U.S. sought to reinforce the Lebanese Armed Forces with military aid packages while simultaneously pressing for IMF-linked reforms.
   This model of limited engagement achieved short-term cost savings but produced only
   incomplete stability. Regional actors such as Turkey, Iraq, and Israel sought to fill gaps, yet their conflicting interests complicated stabilization. Israeli airstrikes on Iranian targets in Syria highlighted the entanglement of U.S. counterterrorism goals with Israel’s anti-Iran campaign.
   Meanwhile, Lebanon’s entrenched sectarian politics constrained the effectiveness of external aid.
   The overall effect was a reliance on unreliable partners and a strategy that avoided costly nation building but lacked the capacity to guarantee long-term order.

    

5. Yemen
   Yemen became a testing ground for Trump’s new deterrence paradigm: reliance on precision strikes and allied operations without deploying U.S. ground forces. The administration escalated air campaigns using advanced platforms such as B-2 bombers and naval missile defense systems, targeting Houthi leadership, weapons depots, and logistics routes. Washington also intensified intelligence cooperation with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, seeking to sever Iran–Houthi linkages.
   However, the Houthis proved resilient and adaptive, with indigenous weapons production, communications infrastructure, and mass mobilization capabilities. Even without Iranian assistance, their military capacity remained significant. Given their role in projecting Iranian influence across the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb strait, Tehran was unlikely to abandon them.
   Thus, U.S. efforts to degrade the Houthis without committing ground troops achieved tactical successes but fell short strategically. Yemen exposed both the strengths and the limits of intermittent deterrence: it reduced U.S. costs but could not eliminate threats, and it raised humanitarian concerns that damaged Washington’s legitimacy.

III. Implications of Trump 2.0 Middle East Policy (Expanded)
Trump’s second-term Middle East policy does not merely represent a tactical adjustment; it
reflects a structural reconfiguration of U.S. engagement with the region. The shift is significant
because it institutionalizes a mode of foreign policy that departs from traditional U.S. norms of
leadership, predictability, and multilateral cooperation. Four implications in particular highlight
the magnitude of this transformation.

1. Challenge to Multilateralism
   Perhaps the most visible departure has been the administration’s skepticism toward multilateral frameworks such as the United Nations, NATO coalitions, and ad hoc international task forces.
   Trump 2.0 has consistently preferred bilateral transactions with states that can deliver immediate returns to Washington. For example, U.S. disengagement from U.N. programs supporting Gaza relief and its sanctions against the International Criminal Court (ICC) illustrate how Washington has abandoned institutional consensus when it is seen as constraining U.S. allies, especially Israel.
   This preference for bilateralism produces short-term efficiency—agreements can be concluded quickly without the delays of multilateral negotiation—but it also undermines the legitimacy and durability of U.S. initiatives. Regional actors perceive U.S. commitments as contingent, subject to the changing calculations of transactional diplomacy. Over time, this risks weakening the very global governance structures that once amplified American power. Allies that previously relied on Washington to coordinate broad coalitions now hedge by diversifying partnerships with powers like Russia, China, or regional organizations.
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3. De-Institutionalized Decision-Making
   A second implication concerns the erosion of institutionalized policymaking. Trump’s reliance on presidential envoys and a tight circle of advisers reflects his distrust of bureaucratic institutions such as the State Department or the National Security Council. While this arrangement allows for speed and direct access to the president, it undermines the predictability and continuity that allies expect from U.S. diplomacy. Decisions appear personalized, dependent on the envoy’s proximity to Trump, rather than grounded in a stable bureaucratic process.
   This produces ambiguity for partners: “whose voice represents Washington?” In contexts such as Saudi normalization talks or Gaza mediation, interlocutors have been uncertain whether commitments made by special envoys carry long-term credibility. The result is a paradox: while Trump’s system appears flexible, it erodes trust and constrains America’s ability to lead long term coalition strategies. For regional leaders used to hierarchical diplomacy, direct access to Trump may provide leverage, but it simultaneously fosters instability in U.S. commitments.
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5. Transformation of Military Strategy
   Trump 2.0 has also introduced a qualitative change in how U.S. power is projected militarily. The administration has shifted away from open-ended interventions and sustained deployments, such as those that characterized the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, toward pinpoint strikes, intermittent deterrence, and proxy-based operations. This approach has been evident in Yemen, where B-2 bombers and precision-guided munitions have replaced ground deployments, and in Syria, where limited U.S. forces remain primarily as support for Kurdish-led operations.
   This new model lowers financial and human costs, aligning with domestic political imperatives to “end endless wars.” Yet the reliance on intermittent strikes carries risks. It signals strength in the short term but rarely produces durable outcomes. In Yemen, for instance, the Houthis’ resilience has demonstrated that air campaigns cannot substitute for structural political solutions. In Syria and Lebanon, “delegated stabilization” has produced fragile arrangements that depend heavily on unreliable local partners. Thus, while Trump’s strategy avoids entanglement, it fosters conditions for recurring instability and potential escalatory spirals when adversaries adapt or retaliate.
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7. Dual Impact on U.S. Leadership
   Finally, Trump’s second-term policy carries a dual impact on U.S. global and regional leadership.
   In the short term, the emphasis on transactional diplomacy and intermittent deterrence provides Washington with greater autonomy, reduced defense expenditures, and political dividends at home. Trump can claim that he is protecting U.S. interests while avoiding the costs of large-scale wars, an appeal that resonates with domestic audiences weary of intervention.
   In the long term, however, these very features erode the foundations of American leadership.
   Regional powers such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Turkey have accelerated their own autonomous strategies to hedge against the unpredictability of U.S. commitments. Iran and its allies have exploited gaps to expand influence in Lebanon, Syria, and the Red Sea. Russia and China, benefiting from vacuums left by Washington, have deepened ties in both security and economic arenas. The overall outcome is a fragmented multipolar Middle East in which U.S.
   credibility as a stabilizing force is steadily diminished. This duality highlights the structural risks embedded in Trump 2.0’s approach: what secures short-term domestic legitimacy simultaneously generates long-term instability abroad. The credibility of U.S. security guarantees—once the backbone of the regional order—is increasingly questioned, forcing allies either to act independently or to seek new patrons.

V. Conditions for Success
For Trump 2.0’s Middle East policy to avoid collapse into structural fatigue and isolation, certain
conditions must be met. While the administration’s approach emphasizes speed, flexibility, and
cost-efficiency, its long-term viability depends on whether Washington can restore credibility,
stabilize its security posture, and rebuild institutional foundations. Three conditions stand out as particularly crucial.

1. Rebuilding Trust with Allies
   First, the United States must rebuild trust with regional allies through stronger coordination and intelligence-sharing. Under Trump 2.0, many partners—such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and even Israel—have expressed uncertainty about the reliability of U.S. commitments. The overreliance on special envoys and executive orders creates ambiguity over whether policies represent sustainable strategy or temporary presidential preferences. To overcome this credibility gap, Washington must institutionalize consultation mechanisms with its core allies, ensuring that shifts in U.S. policy are communicated clearly and integrated into joint planning.
   This would not only reinforce deterrence against common adversaries such as Iran and its proxies but also reduce the incentive for allies to hedge by deepening ties with Russia or China. Restoring a sense of predictability is thus essential for maintaining the U.S. position as the central security provider in the region.
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3. Complementing Intermittent Deterrence
   Second, the U.S. must complement intermittent deterrence with broader security mechanisms capable of producing sustainable stability. Trump’s reliance on precision strikes and limited troop deployments may achieve tactical successes, but it cannot substitute for comprehensive strategies of conflict management. Without complementary frameworks—such as multinational coalitions, regional security dialogues, or burden-sharing arrangements—intermittent deterrence risks becoming reactive rather than preventive.
   For example, in Yemen, precision air campaigns degraded Houthi capabilities but failed to
   eliminate their resilience, while in Syria, delegated stabilization produced only fragile equilibria. Complementary mechanisms are necessary to close these gaps: joint maritime patrols to secure sea lanes, regional counterterrorism centers, and cooperative missile defense initiatives. Such measures would extend the deterrent effect of limited U.S. interventions while reducing the likelihood of recurring instability.
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5. Restoring Bureaucratic Stability
   Third, the administration must restore bureaucratic stability by strengthening institutions such as the State Department and the National Security Council (NSC). Trump’s dismantling of traditional diplomatic capacity—through budget cuts, staff reductions, and a reliance on personal envoys—may have provided agility, but it has undermined institutional memory and policy coherence. Without a robust bureaucratic backbone, foreign policy becomes overly dependent on the personalities and immediate calculations of those closest to the president. Rebuilding bureaucratic infrastructure would provide continuity, even across political transitions,
   and reassure allies that U.S. commitments are not subject to constant reversal. This institutional resilience is also essential for managing complex, multilateral negotiations that cannot be reduced to transactional bargains.
   Broader Structural Risks Even if these three conditions are met, Trump’s policy framework contains deeper risks. His model of conditional engagement—rewarding alignment and punishing divergence—creates short-term leverage but reduces predictability over time. Allies may benefit from compliance but are left uncertain about the durability of U.S. commitments, encouraging them to diversify partnerships. Similarly, the economization of conflict, which fuses trade, investment, and technology with security cooperation, risks undermining the normative leadership that once distinguished U.S. foreign policy. Instead of projecting universal values or long-term strategies,
   Washington appears to be auctioning support in return for concessions.

V. Conclusion
The aftermath of the Iran–Israel War is likely to accelerate a profound transformation of the
Middle East’s regional order. Trump 2.0’s approach has already signaled a decisive U.S. shift—
from a multilateral stabilizer that sought to balance conflicts through institutions and values, to a transactional actor prioritizing short-term national interests, bilateral deals, and selective
engagement. This has been executed through executive orders and rapid diplomacy, strengthening ties with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE but simultaneously hardening regional divides and weakening international organizations. In the post-war environment, the Middle East will likely become more fragmented and multipolar.
The absence of a U.S. “Day After” plan for Gaza highlights Washington’s declining role as a
long-term strategist. Israel is expected to assume greater security responsibilities, though at the cost of deepening tensions with Palestinians and neighbors. Saudi Arabia will use normalization talks with Washington both as leverage and as a pathway to Vision 2030, but Palestinian statehood remains a major obstacle. Iran and the Houthis, meanwhile, are positioned to exploit U.S. retrenchment, reinforcing asymmetric influence in the Gulf and Red Sea.
At the same time, Russia and China are poised to expand their roles—Russia by consolidating its position in Syria and Lebanon, and China through energy deals and infrastructure investment.
This external penetration will magnify regional multipolarity, complicating the already fragile
balance of power.
Although intermittent deterrence and economic–security packages give Washington tactical
flexibility and reduced costs, they cannot guarantee stability. They reinforce the perception that
U.S. commitments are transactional and conditional, pushing allies to diversify partnerships.
Unless Washington rebuilds trust with allies, embeds deterrence in sustainable frameworks, and restores bureaucratic resilience, its ability to shape the post–Iran–Israel War order will steadily decline.
Thus, the likely trajectory of the Middle East is one of greater polarization, shifting alliances, and expanded uncertainty. The United States remains indispensable, but its influence will depend on reconciling short-term pragmatism with long-term stability. Absent such recalibration, the new order will be shaped less by American leadership than by the interplay of regional autonomy and rival great-power intervention.