Türkiye's Position After the 12-Day War

Introduction

In the aftermath of the 12-Day War fought between Israel and Iran in the summer of 2025, the regional balance of power and regional order are under intense scrutiny. This unprecedented escalation in the regional rivalry disrupted the previously presumed regional pecking order and left states to readjust their strategies for regional and global politics. Türkiye, as a regional powerhouse and its only NATO member, disapproved of the war and now has a different regional landscape in which to act. Therefore, this presentation will explain Türkiye's posturing by examining its opposition to the war, the benefits and challenges of a weakened Iran and an emboldened Israel, and its regional posturing and opportunities. 

Türkiye's Opposition to the War

Türkiye had immediate reservations for the intensification from proxy war to direct conflict between the regional rivals because of a host of potential complications. First, it worried that Iran might target Türkiye for kinetic retaliation because of the U.S. and NATO presence at the Incirlik and Kurecik bases. These bases, especially Kurecik, have been problematic to Turkish-Iranian relations for more than a decade and were threatened in the case of a potential Israeli attack in the past which made them a source of domestic unrest in recent years (Hafezi 20111, Turkish Times 2025). Secondly it feared harm to its already fledgling economy. Any disruption in global energy markets or its energy supply security would potentially worsen the situation that many voters considered paramount in the last election. Third, the conflict had the potential to mobilize Iranian Kurdish groups that threatened the fragile peace process that is underway with the PKK in Iraq and the SDF forces in Syria. Lastly, Türkiye hosts millions of refugees who are a burden to the economy and liability to the AKP's electoral success. Any potential increase in the number of refugees in the country threatens the AKP's hold on power (Kaleji 2024). Despite the explicit warnings and requests from Erdogan, the 12-Day War was prosecuted with the U.S. eventuallybombing Iranian nuclear facilities much to the chagrin of Türkiye (Tol 2025). The war left Iran in a weakened position and emboldened Israel which necessitates a recalibration of foreign policy towards these two new realities.

A Weakened Iran

Türkiye strongly condemned what it saw as Israeli aggression in the war and supported 

Iran’s right to self-defense, but that shouldn’t be mistaken for sadness at the sight of a weakened 

Iran, nor should it be seen as overjoy. As was evident in its support for opposition troops in the 

Syrian Civil War and when Erdogan posted support for the Lebanese people after the assassination of Nasrallah in Beirut, Türkiye disliked having a heavy Axis of Resistance presence near its 

borders. It is also logical to assume that Türkiye saw the weakening regional capacity of an

expansionist ideology that is diametrically opposed to its own and the opportunitiesimplied therein

as a net positive. However, there are a lot of risks and complications that a weakened Iran poses 

to Turkish regional objectives and domestic initiatives. Firstly, as part of a domestic vote seeking 

strategy and its ambitions for a strong centralized government Syria, Türkiye engaged with 

Abdullah Ocalan and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (the PKK) to forge a peaceful disarmament. 

But instability and perceived weakness in the Iranian government resulted in several Kurdish 

groups inside Iran, including the Iranian branch of the PKK, organizing to revolt against the 

government (Rogers 2025). This is detrimental to Türkiye's ambitions as the transnational nature 

of Kurdish movements encourage these movements to spread across borders, and any significant 

instability in Iran could spark another refugee crisis for which Turkiye does not have the bandwidth

to absorb. Secondly, Ankara would like to play a larger role in Iraqi politics (in Erbil and in 

Baghdad). More specifically, Ankara wants Baghdad to export more of its energy and to continue 

shipping KRG energy through Türkiye to markets in Europe and its Mediterranean port, Ceyhan

as opposed to sending everything out of Basra. However, with the decimation of Hamas and 

Hezbollah, the weakening of Houthi resolve, and Iran’s ouster from Syria, its forward defense is a 

fraction of what it was a year ago. This development might urge Iran to double down on Iraq as 

one of its only remaining strongholds in the axis of resistance, further complicating Turkeys bilateral and regional ambitions. To be clear, a weakened Iran is a welcome surprise to most in 

Turkey, but it doesn't come without risk and must be carefully navigated. While Türkiye looks to 

turn Iran’s losses into its own gains, it must do so cautiously because of economic, security, and 

political vulnerabilities.

An Empowered Israel

Turkish-Israeli relations were extremely strained in the lead up to the 12-Day War. After years of frosty relations, there were signs of a rapprochement prior to the October 7th Hamas attack on Israel. However, Türkiye has consistently criticized Israel’s execution of the war in Gaza, which it labels a genocide, and relations have deteriorated over the last two years. Furthermore, Israel and Türkiye, the two ostensibly central external actors filling the post-Assad power vacuum,bitterly disagree over Syria’s fate with the two coming close to confrontation earlier this spring. There is mutual distrust regarding the other’s intentions in Syria with both accusing the other of extraterritorial ambitions. From the Israeli point of view, a Türkiye-leaning Sunni dominated Syria poses a threat and it has acted to limit Türkiye's encroachment and state centralization to ensure its preferred weakened Syria (Gebeily and Pamuk 2025). From Türkiye's point of view, Israel is a destabilizing force in Syria that poses a threat to state security because decentralization will give breath to sub-state actors like IS and make it less likely that SDF forces will integrate into the Syrian military. Turkish authorities fear that any turmoil could easily spill across its 900-kilometer shared border with Syria (Cafiero 2025). Additionally, the 12-Day War changed Türkiye's threat perception, seeing increased Israeli power in the region as negative development full of threatening rhetoric directed towards Türkiye that could easily be interpreted as a pretext for violence. (Tur 2025). A report issued by the Turkish National Intelligence Academy in August recommended constructing bomb shelters across the country, improving early warning systems, developing counter espionage in defense sectors, increasing air defense, deepening alliances for more inclusive defense, and closely watching Israeli activity in Cyprus (Soylu 2025). The air dominance demonstrated by Israel in the war highlighted Türkiye's aging air fleet and the need to come to an understanding regarding the S-400 problem with the U.S. so that it may gain re-entry into the F35 program, or at the very least improve its F-16 fleet to modernize its air force and narrow the gap between their respective capabilities.The more recent Israeli attack in Doha on Hamas leadership further escalated tensions with Türkiye scrambling jets along the Syrian and Iraqi border and increasing the number of patrols (Iddon 2025). The increase in aggressive rhetoric coming from both sides is not helpful, but it is likely to be constrained by external forces. Regardless, neither Israel after October 7th, nor Türkiye after the 12-Day War will be hesitating to prepare for the worst. The war in Gaza will have long lasting consequences for ties between the two regional powers, and the sooner the war ends, the sooner there could be steps taken to repair the damage, but it is likely that tensions will remain high for the foreseeable future.

Regional Posturing and Opportunities

The 12-Day War is shaping to be a paradigm changing event rather than a passing moment, the importance of which is shifting on a weekly and daily basis. Several weeks prior to the writing of this paper, Israel crossed all accepted boundaries and struck Hamas targets in Qatar implying that they believed they could act with impunity when and where they so desired. This, predictably, stoked fears of an unchecked Israeli regional hegemon that had replaced the Iranian threat to regional stability. However, in recent hours, Israel has publicly apologized for its attack, and there is regional optimism for a peace in Gaza, although this author remains cautiously optimistic. Türkiye will attempt to take advantage of Iran’s weakened position but cautiously as to not provoke Iran to act against Turkish ambitions. Türkiye and Israel will be at odds with each other for the near future, but that is not to say that under the right leadership there cannot be compartmentalization and cooperation. One such arena for this cooperation is in Syria. As a new regional order begins to appear, Gulf, Turkish, and Israeli cooperation in Syria could be a transformative endeavor that benefits everyone in the forms of recognition, security guarantees, energy corridors, infrastructure projects, and long-needed stability.